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This paper contributes empirical evidence to the on-going debate on short sales. Our 
examination of how market-wide short-sale restrictions affect aggregate market returns 
focuses on two main questions: What is the effect of short-sale restrictions on skewness, 
volatility, the probability of market crashes, and liquidity? What is the effect on the market 
expected return or cost of capital? We report new data on the history of short-selling and put 
option trading regulations and practices from 111 countries, and create a short-selling 
feasibility indicator for the analysis of stock market indices around the world. We find that 
when short-selling is possible, aggregate stock returns are less volatile and there is greater 
liquidity. When countries start to permit short-selling, aggregate stock price increases, 
implying lower a cost of capital. There is no evidence that short-sale restrictions affect either 
the level of skewness of returns or the probability of a market crash. Collectively, our 
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Selling a security one does not own has elicited long standing controversy. The debate 
among investors, traders, regulators, and various market participants on short-selling of 
securities that began as early as the 1600s continues today.
1 Even in the U.S. where short-
selling has been allowed under some conditions since before the twentieth century, concerns 
about it were raised as recent as 2004.
2,3  Opponents of short-selling argue it disrupts orderly 
markets by causing panic selling, high volatility, and market crashes. Proponents claim short-
selling facilitates information transfer, increases liquidity, and improves risk sharing in the 
economy. That fewer than half the exchanges around the world currently allow short sales 
underscores the lack of consensus among regulators on short sales. In the academic 
community, there is strong renewed interest in understanding the effects of short-selling. 
Lamont and Thaler (2003) and Lamont and Stein (2004) for example suggest that short-sale 
constraints by limiting arbitrage played a role in the year-2000 stock market bubble.   
Theory suggests short-sale constraints have impacts on stock return means, volatility, 
skewness, as well as liquidity. Almost all available empirical studies examine the impact of 
short-sale constraints at the individual stock level, using different proxies for the constraints. 
The majority find that short-sale constraints impact stock return means and volatility.
 4,5  
                                                 
1 See http://www.prudentbear.com/press_room_short_selling_history.html for a review of the history of 
short-sale policy debates. 
2 The U.S. stock market started prohibiting short sales on a down tick in 1931. In 1932, brokers were required 
to obtain written authorization from their clients before lending shares. Short sales are allowed today when the 
current price is higher than the price of the previous trade (an uptick) or when the current price is unchanged 
from the previous trade but higher than the last trade at a different price (zero-plus tick). 
3 On June 23, 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission voted to adopt new Regulation SHO under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Regulation SHO provides a new regulatory framework governing 
short-selling of securities. 
4 Most empirical studies of short-sale constraints focus on its relation to over pricing of individual stocks in the 
U.S stock market. These studies differ mainly in their measures of short-sale constraints. Arnold, Butler, Crack 
and Zhang (2004), Asquith, Pathak and Ritter (2004), Brent, Morse and Stice (1990), Dechow, Hutton, 
Meulbroek, and Sloan (2000), Figlewski (1981), Sefieddine and Wilhelm (1996), Senchack and Starks (1993), 
Woolridge and Dickinson (1994) employ short interest or the change of short interest as a proxy for the level 
of short-sale constraints. Figlewski and Webb (1993), and Danielson and Sorescu (2001) employ option 
introduction as proxy for a decline in short-sale constraints.  Jones and Lamont (2002) use lending fees of 
stocks in the ‘loan crowd’ from 1926 through 1933. D’Avolio (2002) use loan supply and loan fees from an 
institutional lending intermediary as proxy for short-sale constraint. Most studies find that short-sale 
constraints are associated with stock overpricing, but a few do not. 
5 Some studies examine volatility. Except for Kraus and Rubin (2002) and Bollen (1998), most studies that 
examine the effect of option introduction (reduction in short sale constraints) on the volatility of the underlying 
stock find that the volatility of stock return is lower after the introduction of options (Conrad 1989; Skinner, 
1989).  3 
While these studies advance our understanding of how short-sale constraints impact 
individual stock returns and suggest that short-sale constraints have a non-negligible effect 
on stock returns, they provide little guidance as to how market-wide restrictions impact the 
aggregate market return or the overall quality of the market. The impact of market-wide 
restrictions on market returns can differ significantly from the impact of short-sale 
restrictions of individual stocks on their returns. For instance, there may be differential 
impact of short-sale constraints on the return distributions of different stocks. Because 
much of the firm-specific stock returns can be diversified away, the effect of short-sale 
constraints on individual stocks does not carry over to the aggregate market returns and has 
no impact on their expected returns. In contrast, the effect of market-wide restrictions may 
be systematic, and thus they impact market expected return.  
Issues such as market-wide liquidity and the probability of a market crash need to be 
studied at the market level. Jones (2002) studies the change in liquidity around events that 
alter the level of short-sale constraints in the U.S. stock markets. He finds that the 
introduction of the requirement that brokers secure written authorization before lending a 
customer’s shares in 1932 had a negative impact on liquidity, but the requirement that short 
sales be executed only on an up tick in 1938 had a positive effect on liquidity. Bris, 
Goetzmann and Zhu (2003) examine the effect of short-sale constraints on characteristics of 
the return distribution of individual stocks and how short-sale constraints affect market 
efficiency. They find markets are more efficient when short-selling is allowed.   
We attempt to shed light on this issue by addressing two questions. First, what is the 
effect of short-sale constraints on skewness and volatility of returns, on the probability of a 
market crash, and on the liquidity of the overall stock market? The motivation for examining 
these characteristics comes from issues brought about by regulators and from the objective 
to asses the validity of our theories on the effects of short-sale constraints. Second, what is 
the effect on the market expected return or the cost of capital? Understanding how short-
sale constraints affect the cost of capital is important because one major purpose of stock 
markets is to facilitate the raising of capital for firms.  
We collect new data on the history of short-sale regulation and feasibility from 111 
countries. We also collect data on the history of put option trading as Figlewski and Webb 
(1993) show that option trading ameliorate short-sale constraints. A bearish investor may 
emulate a short sale by buying a put option. We consider both the legality and feasibility of 4 
short-selling or put option trading. We ask about feasibility because many countries do not 
have rules prohibiting short-selling, yet no short-selling takes place for lack of necessary 
institutions that facilitate stock borrowing across market participants. Conversely, some 
countries officially prohibit short-selling, yet short-selling takes place routinely via off-shore 
markets. We construct an indicator that determines whether short-selling is possible using 
information on the regulation and feasibility of both short-selling and put option trading. We 
use this indicator to analyze a subset of the 111 countries for which we have stock index data 
from December 1969 through December 2002. Our empirical analysis includes panel 
regression tests and event studies.  
When short-selling is possible, we find less volatile aggregate returns. When short-
selling is possible, there is greater liquidity, especially in down markets. We find no evidence 
that short-sale restrictions affect the skewness of returns or the probability of a market crash. 
As to the cost of capital, the event study analysis shows strong evidence that when stock 
markets first allow short-selling, the price of the market index increases. This suggests that 
investors require lower expected returns on stocks when short-selling is possible. Results 
from panel regressions also show evidence that the cost of capital is lower in exchanges 
where short-selling is possible. 
This study makes three contributions to the existing literature. First, it reports new 
data on the feasibility of short-selling for a large number of countries. Second, it provides 
direct evidence that helps resolve the question of whether short-selling should be allowed. 
Collectively, our empirical findings lead us to conclude that allowing short sales enhances 
market quality. Finally, our findings show that market-wide short-selling restrictions affect 
market returns. It is significant that some of our findings on how market-wide short-selling 
restrictions affect the expected market return differ from what has been reported so far 
concerning the effects of short-selling constraints on individual stocks’ expected returns.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I develops hypotheses 
on the effect of short-selling restrictions on market returns and liquidity. Section II describes 
the data we collected on short-selling and put options trading. Section III describes the rest 
of the data used in our analysis. Section IV reports our findings on skewness and volatility of 
returns, market crashes, and liquidity. Section V reports our findings on the cost of capital. 
We conclude and discuss the implications of our findings in Section VI. 5 
I. The effect of short-selling constraints and testable implications  
This section presents some existing theories related to the effect of short-selling constraints 
and develops the hypotheses we later test.  
A. Skewness 
When short-selling is prohibited and investors have heterogeneous beliefs, private 
information of bullish investors is slowly fed into prices through stock trading as they are 
available, but the private information of informed traders who are bearish and do not own 
stocks are not incorporated into prices (see, for example, Miller, 1977; Harrison and Kreps, 
1978). Subsequently, when market information is revealed through nature or public 
announcement, because negative news has not been disseminated, there are greater stock 
market price adjustments for bad news than good news. Even when the distribution of news 
is symmetric ex ante, the realized stock return distribution is more negatively skewed due to 
larger negative shocks when short-selling is not possible. 
Hong and Stein (2003) propose a model to explain why large market declines can 
occur in the absence of news. Their model also produces negatively skewed returns when 
short-selling is not possible.  
Hypothesis 1: Stock market returns are more negatively skewed in markets where short-
selling is not possible.  
B. Volatility 
There is no widely accepted theory on how short-sale constraints affect the volatility of 
market returns. Kraus and Rubin (2002) derive a highly stylized model predicting the impact 
of index options introduction (a form of reduction in short-sale constraints) on the volatility 
of stock returns when there are short-sale constraints on the stocks. Their model predicts 
volatility may increase or decline, depending on the model parameter values. Lacking a 
reason to predict the direction of the effect on volatility, we examine Hypothesis 2.  
Hypothesis 2: The volatility of the market return distribution differs in markets where short-
selling is possible and where it is not. 
C. Liquidity 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) examine the effect of short-sale constraints on the 
adjustment speed of security prices. Their model predicts an increase in the bid-ask spread 6 
and a decline in liquidity when short-selling is not possible. The decline in liquidity is due to 
diminished supply of stocks for sale because some investors who want to sell but do not 
already own stocks cannot take part in the market. In the Diamond-Verrecchia model, 
investors cannot short sell, but the market maker can in order to absorb buying demand 
from investors. When we match the Diamond-Verrecchia model to our empirical setting, we 
cast market makers as owning a large inventory of stock, so they can buy or sell from their 
inventory but not actually short sell. When we classify a market as not allowing short sales, in 
most markets an internal borrowing of securities within a financial institution may still be 
possible. Thus, we test Diamond-Verrecchia’s predictions.  
Hypothesis 3: There is less liquidity in markets where short-selling is not possible.  
D. Expected return and the cost of capital 
Short-selling restrictions affect expected market returns in two ways. First our empirical 
analysis demonstrates that when short-selling is possible market returns are less volatile and 
there is greater liquidity. Variance risk and liquidity are determinants of expected return.
 6 
Since country-specific variance risk is not completely diversifiable across countries in a less 
than fully integrated global financial market, investors should require a lower expected return 
when variance risk is lower and liquidity is greater, which is when short-selling is possible 
(see for example, Bekaert and Harvey, 1995).  
Second, short-selling allows investors to better share risks from their different 
endowments; short-selling itself provides a more complete market. When investors can share 
their endowment risks in a more efficient manner, they require lower rate of return for their 
investments. This is also welfare improving (Ross, 1976). For these reasons we test 
Hypothesis 4.  
Hypothesis 4: The cost of capital is lower in countries where short-selling is possible than 
where it is not.  
E. Stock price change when short-selling prohibition is lifted 
There are two opposing forces that affect price changes when short-selling prohibitions are 
lifted. The first is Miller (1977)’s overpricing effect. When short-selling is prohibited and 
investors have heterogeneous beliefs, only the valuation of the bullish investors and the 
                                                 
6 There is ample empirical evidence that liquidity is a determinant of expected returns. For evidence on liquidity 
see Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), 
Huberman and Halka (2000), and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). 7 
bearish investors who currently own the stock is registered in the stock price. Bearish 
investors who do not own the stock do not participate in the market, so their valuations are 
not registered in the stock price. Hence, on average stocks are over valued compared to the 
full-information prices, and stock prices decline when the short-selling prohibition is lifted.  
On the other hand, if expected returns are lower when short-selling is allowed, stock 
prices should increase when short-selling prohibition is lifted, provided that expected future 
cash flows are constant during this transition period. Theoretically, either of these two 
effects could dominate. What happens to the stock prices when a short-selling prohibition is 
lifted is an empirical question.  
Hypothesis 5: The aggregate market price changes when a short-selling prohibition is lifted. 
II. Legality and feasibility of short-selling and put options trading  
We collect data on the legality and the feasibility of short-selling and operation of put 
options trading in 111 stock markets around the world that have a websites and for which 
we could get contact information. To our knowledge, this is the largest set of such data 
available. Twenty-three of the countries are classified as developed markets, and 88 as 
emerging markets according to Morgan Stanley Capital International Inc.’ classification. We 
surveyed these markets and derivatives exchanges if there were such a separate entity, during 
the second half of 2001 and during 2002. 
Our survey letter asked whether the stock market allows short-selling and, if yes, 
what is the first date it was allowed.  We also asked whether short-selling was feasible in 
practice, and, if yes, when was the first date it was feasible. We asked this second question 
because many countries do not ban short-selling, but at the same time no short-selling can 
actually take place because there are no enabling regulations and facilities. Then again, a 
country like Singapore officially prohibits short-selling, but it routinely takes place via off-
shore markets. The actual feasibility of short-selling should have a stronger influence than 
simple legality on capital markets. We also asked whether put options were available for 
trading, and, if yes, as of what date. Wherever possible, we cross-checked answers against the 
2000 edition of the International Encyclopedia of the Stock Market, the 2000 edition of the 
Handbook of World Stock, Derivative and Commodity Exchanges, and with various foreign national 
practitioners. 8 
A. Short-selling 
Table I reports on the legality and the feasibility of short sales. Most developed countries, 
except for Singapore, currently allow short sales. Many of these countries have always 
allowed them barring a few temporary moratoriums around the time of World War II. At the 
same time, many emerging countries have established laws or policies allowing short sales. 
The latest emerging country to officially allow short sales is Peru (2002). In 2002, 95 percent 
of developed countries allowed short sales, compared to 31 percent of emerging countries.  
Before 1990, the respective figures were 64 percent and 10 percent. 
The actual feasibility of short-selling is difficult to measure. We rely on exchange 
officials, academicians, and industry connections to classify the countries in terms of 
feasibility of short-selling.  Eighty six percent of developed countries report that short-selling 
is feasible in practice, but only 12 percent of emerging markets report that short-selling is 
feasible. Before 1990, the respective figures were 68 percent and 6 percent. 
Figure 1 graphs the history of the legality and feasibility of short-selling and put 
option trading in the 20
th century.  It plots the time series of the number of countries in the 
world, the number of countries with stock markets, the number of countries that allow 
short-selling, and the number of countries where short-selling is feasible.
7  
It is apparent from Figure 1 that before the 1990s, while the number of countries 
with stock markets increased substantially, the number of countries allowing short-selling did 
not increase at the same rate; the ratio actually declined. Only after 1990 do we see a 
significant increase in the number of countries allowing short-selling. In countries that 
started allowing short-selling officially, policy did not necessarily translate into practice. In 
fact, we see a wider gap between the number of countries that officially allow short-selling 
and the number of countries where short-selling is feasible widened in the 1990s. Figure 1 
shows a clear picture that policy markers have not reached a consensus on whether to permit 
and facilitate short-selling.  
C.  Put Options trading 
Table II reports the legality and operation of put options trading. U.S. is the first country to 
                                                 
7 The data for the number of countries in the world come from the 2002 CIA World Factbook.  We obtained the 
date of incorporation of a stock market from the 2000 Handbook of Stock, Derivative and Commodity Exchanges or 
else the website of the country’s stock exchange.  Note that the number of countries with stock markets also 
includes countries whose stock markets were temporarily closed due to a crisis. 9 
trade put options. In 2002, there was put options trading in 91 percent of developed 
countries and 19 percent of emerging countries. Before 1990, the respective figures were 55 
percent and 1 percent. 
Countries may have different policies on short-selling and put options trading. For 
example, in India, short-selling is uncommon, and it is prohibited to foreign investors. We 
have classified India as never allowing short-selling. Put options, however, were introduced 
in July 2001, after the Ketan Parekh scam. India’s SEBI’s (its SEC) wanted to encourage 
practices in line with the norms of developed markets and to provide a hedging tool for 
investors while at the same time discouraging speculators. Israel also does not allow short-
selling but has put options trading. Other countries initiated put options trading before they 
started to allow short-selling. Chile is one example. The correlation between the existence of 
put options trading and short-selling is 0.34, which suggests that considering short-selling 
feasibility alone gives an incomplete account of the ability of investors to take positions that 
are effectively short positions.  
We construct a binary variable that reflects the ability of investors to take short 
positions either through the existence of short-selling or put options trading, and employ it 
in the empirical analysis. We label this variable SSPO feasibility. For each country in each 
month, SSPO feasibility equals one if either short-selling or put options trading is possible. It 
equals zero otherwise.  
III. Data 
A.  Stock market variables 
Monthly equity indices are available from Datastream database for of 23 developed markets 
and 34 emerging markets. The data range from December 1969 through December 2002.  
These are value-weighted indices calculated with dividend reimbursement. We take the 




                                                 
8 The MSCI World Index is an index of only developed countries.  It begins in December 1969.  In principle, 
the MSCI All-Country World Index, which includes more countries, might be a better choice, but in practice, 
because it is available only since December 1987, and has a 0.9968 correlation with the MSCI World Index, 
MSCI World Index is a better choice. 10 
We compute monthly skewness as: 
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t i r , ,τ  is the daily return of day τ in month t of the index of country i, and  t i r , is the mean 
return of month t; n is the number of daily observations in month t.  
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Following Bollerslev, Engle, and Wooldrige (1988), we also examine the conditional 
volatility of monthly returns using a multivariate ARCH model specified as: 
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where ri, t  and rw, t is the dollar monthly return of the stock market index i and the world 
market index in month t ; j t i − , ε is the innovation in monthly return of the stock market index 
of country i in month t-j ; hw, t is the conditional variance of the monthly return of the stock 
market index of the world in month t ; hi,t, is the conditional variance of the monthly return 
of the stock market index of country i in month t. The conditional volatility of monthly 
returns is the square root of hi,t . 
We estimate the model in (3) using maximum likelihood. As in Engle, Lilien, and 
Robins (1987), the weights of the lagged residual vectors are taken to be 1/2, 1/3, and 1/6. 
The constants  2 a , b2, and c2 are constrained to be identical for every country-world pair.. 11 
We define a binary monthly crash variable to identify a month that the stock market 
drops more than two standard deviations. The standard deviation is the average of the 
previous three months. The variance  t i crash ,  is defined as:  
t i crash , = 1, if 
,, 2 it it r σ <  
t i crash , = 0, otherwise,   where  ,, 1 , 2 , 3 ˆˆˆ () / 3 it it it it σ σσσ −−− = ++ .  
We measure liquidity using turnover. Turnover is defined as the ratio of volume of dollar 
trade per month to dollar market capitalization at the end of the month.  
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) also predict that prohibiting short sales reduces liquidity 
more when stock prices decline than when they increase.  We use asymmetric volume to 
capture this asymmetry in liquidity. Monthly asymmetric volume for country i is defined as: 
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where 
t i Vol , ,τ  is the daily dollar volume for day τ in month t,  t i D , is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if the return on day τ  is positive and 0 if it is negative, and n is the number 
of daily observations in month t.  
B. Control variables 
Stulz (1999) points out that liberalization reduces the cost of equity through two routes.  It 
reduces required return because risk-sharing improves, and because corporate governance 
improves. Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Henry (2000) report that financial market 
liberalization reduces the cost of equity. They also show it affects liquidity, volatility, and 
potentially other variables of interest in our analysis. We control for the confounding effects 
of liberalization in all our regression tests. The indicator variable liberalization changes from 
zero to one in the month after the official liberalization. We use liberalization dates from 
Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and from Bae, Bailey and Mao (2003). 
Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) report that lagged return and lagged trend-adjusted 
turnover predict skewness. We include them as control variables in tests of skewness.   
Lagged trend-adjusted turnover is defined as in Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001).  12 
   Ferson and Harvey (1993) and Dumas and Solnik (1995) report returns of an index 
of a country may also vary with its exchange rate. In tests of expected returns, we control for 
exchange rate variation by including monthly foreign exchange rates from International 
Financial Statistics.    
There may be other differences across countries that we do not explicitly model. To 
control for such differences, we use a country-fixed-effect dummy. We find the same results 
when we conduct the analyses without a country-fixed effect dummy but including 
additional control variables: GDP growth, shareholders’ rights, exchange rate risk, and 
liquidity. 
IV. Short-sale restrictions, market returns, and liquidity 
In this section, we report the empirical test results of the relation between short-sale 
restrictions, skewness, volatility, market crash, and liquidity. All panel least square regressions 
include a country-specific dummy variable (not reported) in addition to the reported control 
variables. All reported regression estimates are corrected for country-specific 
heteroskedasticity and country-specific autocorrelation.  
A. Short-sale restrictions and skewness,  
To examine the relation between skewness and short-sale restrictions we estimate panel 
regressions of monthly skewness on SSPO feasibility controlling for liberalization, lagged 
return, lagged detrended turnover, and a time trend. Panel A of Table IV report these panel 
regression estimates.  
For those countries that had a short-selling regime change which also have skewness 
data around the event date, we compare the average skewness pre- and post-event. We 
compare the average skewness over a two-year pre-event period and a two-year post-event 
period. We also test using a five-year pre- and post- event periods. Panel B of Table IV 
reports the pre- and post-event averages of skewness, their difference, and the p-value 
testing the hypothesis that there is no change in average skewness before and after short-
selling feasibility changed. The test results in both Panels A and B indicate that short-selling 
restrictions have no impact on the skewness of the aggregate market return distribution.  
 13 
B. Short-sale restrictions and volatility 
Panel A of Table V reports coefficients of panel regressions of return variance on SSPO 
feasibility, controlling for liberalization, and time-trend. Excluding the time trend gives 
similar results. We report results of tests with conditional variance of daily returns and 
monthly returns from the ARCH model in equation (3). Except for the case of monthly 
variance of developed countries, the coefficient estimates of SSPO feasibility in all the other 
cases are negative and highly statistically significant. The coefficients are economically 
significant as well. The coefficient of SSPO feasibility in column 2 is -0.0024 which means 
that the standard deviation of monthly returns in countries that allow short-selling and those 
that do not differ by 0.05.  
C. Short-sale restrictions and market crash 
The variable crash equals one in months with a negative return of higher than 2 standard 
deviations, where the standard deviation of returns is the average of standard deviation 
returns during the previous three months. Table VI reports coefficient estimates of panel 
logit regressions of crash on SSPO feasibility, controlling for lagged volatility and 
liberalization. Results are similar for panel probit regressions. The results show that the 
feasibility of short-selling has no relation to the probability of a market crash. 
D. Short-sale restrictions and liquidity 
We use turnover as a proxy for liquidity. To mitigate the effect of outliers, which occur 
because the denominators are small in some countries, we take the natural logarithm of this 
ratio.  Table VII reports panel regressions of turnover on SSPO feasibility, controlling for 
lagged absolute return, lagged volatility, liberalization, and a time trend. The coefficient 
estimates of SSPO feasibility are positive and highly significant in all regressions. The 
relation between turnover and SSPO feasibility is also economically significant. A coefficient 
of 0.3422 (column 3 of Table VII) translates into 15 percentage points higher turnover when 
short-selling is possible. These results support the prediction by Diamond and Verrecchia 
(1987) that there is reduced liquidity when short-selling is not possible. 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) also predict less liquidity in a down market than in 
an up market when short-selling is not possible. That is, volume asymmetry (VA) should be 
lower when short-selling is possible than when it is not. Table VIII reports coefficients of 14 
panel regressions of VA on SSPO feasibility, controlling for liberalization (columns 1, 3, and 
5). The asymmetry in volume is negative and significant only in developed markets and not 
in emerging markets.  
Regulators who oppose short-selling often argue that in a large market decline, 
speculative short-sellers will flock to the market, increase panic selling, increase down-market 
volume, and cause larger market decline than if speculative short-sellers were not present. 
This line of argument predicts that VA should be lower when short-selling is possible, but 
even more so when there is significant market decline or a market crash.  
To examine the relation between VA, short-sale constraints, and market crash, we 
estimate a panel regression of volume asymmetry on SSPO feasibility, crash, and an 
interaction term SSPO feasibility × crash, controlling for liberalization. If opponents of 
short-selling are correct, then we should expect the interaction term to be negative. In other 
words, we expect the feasibility of short-selling to be associated with a more negative volume 
asymmetry when there is a crash. The coefficient estimates of this regression are in Columns 
2, 4, and 6 of Table VIII. The coefficient of the interaction term is not significantly different 
from zero lending no support to this argument.  
V. Short-sale constraints and the cost of capital 
To examine the effect of short-sale constraints on the cost of capital, we employ an event 
study and panel regressions using two proxies for the cost of capital. An event study has the 
advantage that it directly measures the discrete equity price change that should occur if there 
is a change in the cost of equity and stock price caused by a change in short-selling rules. It is 
uninfluenced by other macroeconomic conditions outside the event window or by 
differences among countries. Henry (2000) uses the same method to study the effect of 
liberalization on the cost of equity.   
A. Event study 
Our analysis uses the actual date change in short-selling rules as the event date and not the 
announcement date for several reasons. First, the pessimist investors who did not trade due 
to short-selling restrictions can start trading only when the practice is implemented, so their 
effect on the level and on the volatility of the stock price occurs on the implementation date. 
Second, from a theoretical perspective, the expected return may increase or decline when 15 
short-selling restrictions are lifted. The wild card is the effect on volatility, which may either 
increase or decline when short-selling is possible. Because of this uncertainty, investors may 
react to the news on the implementation date when this uncertainty is resolved.  
Perhaps most important, when rules allowing short sales are first announced, in 
many cases it is uncertain whether it will be implemented at all or in a timely manner, and it 
would be uncertain as well whether the rule change will make short-selling feasible. Will the 
institutional infrastructure support short sales? How costly will it be to short? Will there be 
market makers willing to trade on a short position? These uncertainties are likely to keep 
investors from reacting to announcements of short sale rule changes even when they think 
they can predict the market reaction to a change in short-selling restrictions. As the 
implementation date nears, these uncertainties are resolved, so we should detect a gradual 
market reaction shortly before the implementation and at the implementation date. Conrad 
(1989) also finds change in short-sale constraints such as introduction of option trading 
affects price around the implementation date and not the announcement date. 
We collected data on the specific dates an exchange started allowing short sales or 
put options trading for 31 events. We use the periods from -130 days to -30 days and from 
+30 days to +130 days to estimate the world market CAPM, which is used to calculate the 
excess abnormal returns during the event window. Returns are calculated using closing prices 
of each country index and the world market index. 
Table IX presents the abnormal returns and the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
from five days before the event date to five days after the event date. Columns 1 and 2 
report abnormal excess returns and cumulative abnormal excess returns considering both 
short-selling rule change and put option introduction events. Columns 3 and 4 report CARs 
considering only short-selling rule change event. Columns 5 and 6 report CARs considering 
only put option trading change event. The CARs around the events that relax short-selling 
restrictions are mostly positive. In column 2, the CAR over the 11-day period for all events 
is 3.6%, which is economically significant. We test the statistical significance of this CAR 
using the methodology proposed by Brown and Warner (1985), and using a standard error 
estimated for the 11-day period. The t-statistic of 2.5 rejects the hypothesis that the CAR 
equals zero at the 5% significance level.  
Figure 2 graphs the CARs for two calendar months (40 trading days) around the 
event date. The shaded area in the figure highlights the 20 trading days around the event. 16 
The CARs are increasing in this shaded region and are quite flat outside. The CARs gradual 
increase starting approximately eight trading days before the event date, and continues to 
increase for the next ten trading days. This gradual increase in the market price prior to the 
implementation date is consistent with the idea that investors know about rule change from 
prior announcements, but are uncertain about actual implementation and the feasibility of 
short-selling until several days prior to the implementation date.  
Evidence from our even study shows that relaxing short-selling restrictions results in 
a significant decline in the cost of capital. We have noted two forces driving the aggregate 
market price change when short-selling restrictions are lifted: Miller’s overpricing effect, and 
the change in the market required rate of return due to lower variance risk, increased in 
liquidity, and improve risk-sharing in the economy. If the overpricing effect dominates, we 
should see market prices decline when short-selling restrictions are lifted. If the required 
expected return effect dominates, we should see market prices increase when short-selling 
restrictions are lifted. Our findings suggest that the latter effect is dominant at the aggregate 
market level. 
At the firm level, some studies of U.S. stocks find reduce short-selling restrictions is 
associated with lower stock price or lower subsequently return (Jones and Lamont, 2001). 
Do our findings contradict evidence at the firm level? In a highly integrated market such as 
the U.S. stock market, the increase in firm-specific risks can be diversified away. Therefore, 
reduced variance and increased in liquidity which arise with reduced short-sale constraints at 
the firm level may not affect their expected stock returns. Miller’s overpricing effect, 
however, affects individual stock prices as long as there are bearish investors who cannot 
short sell. Thus, it is likely that the overpricing effect dominates at the firm level; stock prices 
decline when short-selling constraints are reduced. Our findings do not contradict previous 
evidence at firm level, and they highlight the different effect of market-wide restrictions on 
the aggregate market return and the effect of firm-level constraints on firm returns.  
The choice of an asset pricing model usually has little impact on an event study 
because the event window is narrow diminishing the impact of fundamental risk adjustment. 
Nonetheless, we carried out robustness checks by calculating excess abnormal returns in a 
number of ways: (1) as daily excess returns minus each country’s own mean excess return, 
(2) as daily excess returns less daily excess world market index returns, and (3) as excess 
returns without risk adjustments. Our conclusions do not change.  17 
B. Cross-country tests 
We also examine the effect of short-selling restrictions on the cost of capital using panel 
regressions. A country’s cost of capital is the required rate of return, which we measure using 
two approaches: (1) the cost of equity computed from country index returns after 
accounting for systematic risks, and (2) country credit ratings.  
In the first test, we adopt the international asset pricing model proposed by Bekaert 
and Harvey (1995). This model allows a country to evolve from a developing segmented 
market, where risk is measured by the country’s variance, to a country integrated with world 
equity markets, where risk is measured by the sensitivity of a country’s equity returns to 
movements in the world market portfolio. The special case of complete integration, where 
the world factor is the only factor, is nested in this model. We estimate a simplified version 
of Bekaert and Harvey (1995)’s model in our computations of the risk-adjusted excess equity 
returns.  
                           ( ) t i t i t i t w i t i t f t i e h h r r , , var , , , cov , 0 , , 1 + − + + = − λ φ λ φ α    ,                                (5) 
 
where ri, t is the dollar monthly return of the stock market index of country i in month t ; rf, t 
is the monthly return of the one-month U.S. T-Bill in month t ; 
0 α  is a constant that would 
be estimated; 
, it φ   is a measure of the level of integration of country i in month t ; 
cov λ  is the 
price of the covariance risk that would be estimated; hi,w, t is the conditional covariance of the 
monthly returns of the stock market index of country i with the monthly return of the world 
index in month t ; 
var λ is the price of own country variance risk that would be estimated. We 
restrict 
var λ  to be the same across all countries. hi ,t is the conditional variance of  returns of 
the stock market index of country i in month t ; and ei,t is the residual error term. 
We estimate equation (5) using non-linear least squares estimates. The results are 
presented in Panel A of Table X. The independent variables in model (5), conditional 
covariance hi,w, t, and conditional variance hi,t , are separately estimated pair-wise for each 
country i and the world from the multivariate ARCH model in equation (3).   
The independent variable  t i, φ  in model (5) measures the level of integration with the 
world market of country i in month t. It is computed as in Bekaert and Harvey (1997): 18 
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t i, φ  is zero when a country is not integrated in the world market; it is one when a country is 
fully integrated.  
Panel A of Table X reports the risk premium estimates for covariance risk and 
variance risk. Like Bekaert and Harvey (1997), we find that a country’s expected return is 
determined by both the covariance risk and the country’s own variance risk. Both risk 
premium estimates are positive. The residual from equation (5), which measures excess 
abnormal monthly returns, is used as the dependent variable in the panel regressions. 
Panel B of Table X reports regressions of the residual term,  t i e , , on SSPO feasibility, 
controlling for liberalization, foreign exchange risk, and country-fixed effects. The 
coefficients estimates of SSPO existence in all regressions are negative, which indicates that 
the cost of capital is lower when short-selling is possible. However, the coefficients are not 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  
A common difficulty in international finance is obtaining expected return from 
equity returns for a large number of countries due to limited equity data from 57 countries. 
Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1996) propose using the country credit rating from Institutional 
Investor’s semi annual survey of bankers as a proxy for expected return. From 75 to 100 
bankers rate each country’s credit worthiness on a scale of 0 to 100.   
Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1996) show that the credit worthiness measure is a very 
good proxy for systematic risk in the equity markets. For countries for which equity indices 
are available, the log of country credit rating tracks the expected return of equity as well as or 
better than other available measures, particularly in segmented emerging economies. We thus 
use these country credit ratings as our second proxy for expected returns, allowing us to 
increase our data sample from 57 countries to 99 countries.  
Table XI reports panel regressions of the log of country credit rating on SSPO 
feasibility, controlling for liberalization and country-fixed effects. The coefficient estimate 
for all-countries sample is 0.1031, and it is statistically significant at the 1% level. Exhibit 4 in 
Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1996) shows that an increase of one in the log of a country’s 19 
credit rating decreases the cost of equity by 10.47 percentage points. This implies that the 
cost of equity is lower by 1.07 (0.1031 × 10.4) percentage points per year when short-selling 
is possible. 
The influence of short-sale restrictions appears stronger in emerging countries 
compared to developed countries; the magnitude of the coefficient of SSPO feasibility is 
higher and the p-value is lower for emerging countries.  
VI. Discussions and concluding remarks  
We have provided empirical evidence on the debate about the way market-wide short-selling 
restrictions affect aggregate market returns and on whether short-selling should be allowed. 
We focus on two important issues: the effect on skewness and volatility of the market return 
distribution, the probability of market crashes, and liquidity, and the effect on the cost of 
capital.  
A particular contribution is that our research considers aggregate-market level 
evidence and uses data from a much broader range of countries than typically studied. We 
report regulation and feasibility of short sales and put options trading in 111 countries, and 
use a subset of this data to analyze the effect of short-selling restrictions. When short-selling 
is possible, aggregate stock returns are less volatile, and there is greater liquidity. When 
countries institute short-selling for the first time, aggregate stocks price increase, implying a 
lower cost of capital. There is no evidence that short-sale restrictions affect the level of 
skewness of returns or the probability of a market crash. 
Our study has a number of implications. First, we examine how well current theory 
works for market-wide short-selling restrictions and market returns. We find short-selling 
restrictions have no effect on skewness of market returns as some theories predict. There is 
strong evidence, however, that volatility is lower when short-selling is possible although the 
theoretical predictions are ambiguous. Our finding on volatility is similar to some research 
findings at the firm-level that volatility declines with the introduction of options trading, 
which is an event that reduces short-selling constraints. Our findings on liquidity indicate 
reduced liquidity in the absence of short-selling. 
Second, theory posits that there are two forces impacting expected returns due to 
short-selling restrictions. Our findings on expected return at the market level appear contrary 20 
to many other empirical studies of short-sale constraints and expected return at the 
individual stock level. We conclude that while in many cases the overpricing effect may 
dominate at the individual stock level, the lower required expected return dominates at the 
market level. This suggests that short-sale constraints affect the market and individual stocks 
differently – a distinction not made explicit in the literature so far. 
Finally, we find no evidence that short-selling disrupts orderly markets by causing 
panic selling, high volatility, or market crashes. The empirical evidence shows overall that 
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Table I: Legality and feasibility of short-selling  
 
This table reports survey data on short-selling regulations and feasibility from 111 countries from 
immediately after WWII through 2002. The figures in Column 2 are the year short-selling became legal. 
The figures in Column 3 are the year when short-selling became feasible. Yes means short-selling has 
always been legal or feasible. No means short-selling has always been prohibited or not feasible. Details 
about short-selling rules and implementation in are in the last column. 
 
Country   Legality  Feasibility  Details 
Developed Markets      
Australia Yes  Yes   







Regulations are not very explicit. Short-selling is allowed and 
widespread. 







The Copenhagen Stock Exchange's Rule Book does not carry any short-
selling restrictions. There had never had such restrictions in Denmark.  
Finland 1998  No  Tax  laws  (transfer)  inhibits would-be short sellers. 
France Yes  Yes   













Short-selling wasvprohibited until 1/3/94. In 3/96 many restrictions 
were lifted (including tick rule abolished). On 9/7/98 more restrictions 
were placed (including tick rule). The number of designated securities 
for short-selling is revised on a quarterly basis. 
Ireland Yes  Yes  No  restrictions. 





              Yes 
 
Short-selling is regulated by Article 162 of the Securities and Exchange 
Law. It is not restricted. 
Luxembourg 1991  1991  Circular  CSSF 91/75 allows short-selling. 










Short-selling was allowed since 4/92 for approved securities with 
conditioned on liquidity. Since 7/00 all FASTER securities can be 







Short-selling was allowed in 1992. In 8/99-9/99 short selling rules and 
guidelines instituted making it feasible. 







Securities lending takes place outside of the Island. Short -selling is 
discouraged by regulators, however, it is widespread. 
Spain  1992  No  Allowed in 1992, but not common. 










The Swiss exchange has never issued any rules on short-selling. Nor did 
its predecessors, various local exchanges in Zurich, Geneva, Basel, etc. 
which were floor based and in operation until 95/96.  



















The U.S. started prohibiting short sales on a down tick in 1931. In 1932, 
brokers were required to obtain written authorization from their clients 
before lending shares. Currently, short sales are allowed when the 
current price is higher than the price of the previous trade (an uptick) or 
when the current price is unchanged from the previous trade but higher 
than the last trade at a different price (zero-plus tick). 
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Country   Legality  Feasibility  Details 
Emerging  
Markets      













Short-selling is not common for stocks, but common for government 
bonds. Short-sellings may be held for up to 365 consecutive days. 
Mercado de Valores de Buenos Aires may suspend new short sales at 
any moment. The law allowing short-selling was inacted on 9/6/1999. 
Armenia  Yes  No  Allowed but not feasible yet. 
Azerbaijan No  No   
Bahrain No  No   
Bangladesh No No   
Barbados No  No   
Bermuda No  No   
Bolivia No  No   













Legal since 6/9/86. CBLC  (the  exchange's  clearing  and settlement 
corporation) has  a  securities  custody  service called Securities Lending 
Program  -  BTC, which was implemented in 4/96. However, short-
selling is very limited. 










Bolsa de Santiago approved short selling, rules allowing short-selling on. 
Short-selling was exempt from capital gains taxation and was more 
feasible after 11/6/01. 
China No  No   
Colombia No  No   
Costa Rica  No  No   
Croatia No  No   
Cyprus No  No  Considered a criminal offence. 
Czech Republic   Yes  Yes  No regulation prohibiting short-selling. Short selling exists. 
Ecuador No  No   
Egypt No  No   







No regulation restricting short-selling. But there is no regulation 







Part VII item 46 (4) of 1996 act allows short-selling and establishes rules 
on short-selling practice. 
Georgia No  No   
Ghana No  No   
Greece  2001  No  Short selling allowed in 5/31/01, but not widespread. 
Guatemala No  No   







No regulation restricting short-selling. But there is no regulation 
governing short-selling practice. 
Iceland 1986  No  Short-selling  is  uncommon.  It is restricted for mutual funds. 
India  Yes  No  Prohibited for foreign investors. No real existence. 
Indonesia  No  No  Expected to be launched in 7/03. 
Iran No  No   
Israel No  No   
Ivory coast  No  No   
Jamaica No  No   
Jordan No  No   
Kazakhstan No No  Kazakhstan 26 
 
Country   Legality  Feasibility  Details 
Emerging Markets      
Kenya No  No   
Kuwait No  No   
Kyrgystan No  No   
Latvia No  No   
Lebanon  No  No  Prohibited by article 182 of decree 7667 of 1995 (Beirut Bourse). 
Lithuania No  No   
Macedonia No  No   









Started existing in 
1996, stopped in 
1997 
 
Short-selling started on 9/30/96. The prohibition on 8/28/97 was a 
reaction to the Asian currency crisis. 
 
 
Malta No  No  Legislation  is  currently being drafted to allow securities lending. 
Mauritius No  No   
Mexico Yes  Yes   
Moldova No  No   
Mongolia No  No   
Morocco No  No   
Namibia  1992  No  Short-selling is allowed by article 24 of the Stock Exchange Control Act.
Nicaragua No  No   
Nigeria No  No   
Oman No  No   
Pakistan No  No   
Palestine No  No   
Panama No  No   
Paraguay No  No   



















Short-selling was prohibited in 12/89. The revision of the rules in 1996 
lifted the prohibition. In 1999 the Securities and Exchange Commission 
approved the proposed PSE Rules that would make short-selling more 
feasible. Its implementation is still pending the passage of the Senate 
Committee Report No. 115: Elimination of Imposition of DST on the 







WSE has no rules on short-selling. Short-selling is regulated by a decree 
of counsel of ministers; short-selling was first allowed on 1/1/00. 
Romania No  No   
Russia Yes  Yes  Always  existed;  Short-selling was explicitly regulated since 3/23/02. 
Saudi Arabia  No  No   







Short selling is not expressly allowed or prohibited at the moment, but 
changes in regulation regarding this matter are expected. 









Country   Legality  Feasibility  Details 













Short-selling has been allowed since 9/96. But short-selling is prohibited to 
insiders and available on designated securities. Stocks ineligible for short-
selling include stocks under surveillance and stocks designated as 
administrative issues. 
Sri Lanka  No  No   
Sudan No  No   







Regulations allow short-selling since 9/4/98. But the shot-sale price must be 
higher or equal previous day's closing price.  
Tanzania No  No   
Thailand  1998  2001  10/98 rules and regulations placed. Short selling is feasible since 1/1/01. 
Trinidad and Tobago  No  No   
Tunisia No  No   
Turkey  1995  1995  4/3/95 Short selling allowed for stocks on ISE National 100. 
Ukraine No  No   










The legislation does not prohibit short-selling But there is no regulatory 
framework that supports short-selling. Investors can lend/borrow securities 
directly via depositary houses only.  
Venezuela No  No   
Yugoslavia No  No   
Zambia No  No   


























Table II: Feasibility of put options trading 
 
This table reports survey data on put options trading feasibility from 111 countries from immediately after 
WWII through 2002. The figures in Column 2 are the year put options trading became feasible. Yes 
means put options trading has always been feasible. No means put options trading has never been 
feasible. Details about short-selling rules and implementation in are in the last column. 
 
Country   Feasibility  Details 
Developed Markets      
Australia 1982  9/9/82. 
Austria 1991  8/10/91. 





Options started listing on the Montreal Exchange on 9/15/75. Started listing on the 









European style put options on futures on the KFX share index started trading since 
9/21/90. On 12/7/90 put options on individual Danish equities started trading. On 
3/18/91 put options on government bonds started trading On 9/6/95. Put American 





Options on the FOX index, which includes the 25 most traded stocks on the Helsinki 
Exchange, Started on 5/2/88. 
France 1987   
Germany  1990  Started in 1/90 on individual stocks, and in August on the DAX index. 
Hong Kong  1993  Index options started trading on 3/5/93. Stock options started trading on 9/8/95. 





Option contracts on the MIB 30 started trading on 11/15/95. Options on some of the 
most liquid individual stocks started trading on 2/19/96. 
Japan  1989  TOPIX Index puts started trading in 10/20/89. Equity puts started trading in 7/97. 





Options on 3 listed stocks started in 4/78. Shortly after, options on 41 listed stocks 
started trading. 
New Zealand  No   
Norway 1990  5/22/90. 





Options market relaunched on 3/8/93 following an abortive attempt in 1980 which 
folded after 2 years. 





The OM Stockholm/OMLX London exchange introduced options on Swedish stocks on 
6/12/87. 
Switzerland  1988  Options on individual equities were first listed on SOFFEX on 5/19/88. 















Country   Feasibility  Details 
Emerging Markets    
Albania No   
Argentina  1991  The rules were introduced in 1986, but the first transactions were in 7/3/91. 
Armenia No   
Azerbaijan No   
Bahrain No   
Bangladesh No   
Barbados No   
Bermuda No   
Bolivia No   
Botswana No   
Brazil  1984  Stock options 12/18/84. Index options 7/96. 
Bulgaria No   
Chile  1994  Options began trading in 8/94. 
China No   
Colombia No   
Costa Rica  No   
Croatia No   
Cyprus No   
Czech Republic   No   
Ecuador No   
Egypt No   
El Salvador  No   
Estonia  1996  Traded from spring 1996; no regulated option market with central counterparty. 
Fiji No   
Georgia No   
Ghana No   
Greece  2000  Put options on the FTSE/ASE-20 index started trading on 9/11/00. 
Guatemala No   
Honduras No   
Hungary 2000  Options  trading  began at BSE on 2/18/00. 
Iceland No   
India  2001  Option trading introduced on 7/2/01, after the Ketan Parekh Scam. 
Indonesia  2004  Started on 10/6/04 with 5 blue chip stocks. 
Iran No   
Israel 1993    8/1/93. 
Ivory coast  No   
Jamaica No   
Jordan No   
Kazakhstan No   
Kenya No   
Kuwait No   
Kyrgystan No   
Latvia No   
Lebanon No   
Lithuania No   
Macedonia No   
 
 30 
Country   Feasibility  Details 
Emerging Markets    
Malawi No   
Malaysia 2000  12/1/00. 
Malta No   
Mauritius No   
Mexico Na   
Moldova No   
Mongolia No   
Morocco No   
Namibia No   
Nicaragua No   
Nigeria No   
Oman No   
Pakistan No   
Palestine No   
Panama No   
Paraguay No   
Peru No   
Philippines No   
Poland 2000  Put  warrants  traded since 11/2/00. 







FORTS has 2 put options on United Energy System and Gazprom that started trading 
in 9/19/01. Options have been trading on and off for 10 years unsuccessfully until the 
above date. 
Saudi Arabia  No   
Slovakia No   
Slovenia No   





Option on KOSPI 200 began trading on 7/7/97 and stock options for individual firms 
began trading on 1/28/02. 
Sri Lanka  No   
Sudan No   
Swaziland No   
Taiwan No   
Tanzania No   
Thailand No   
Trinidad and Tobago  No   
Tunisia No   
Turkey No   
Ukraine No   
Uruguay No   
Uzbekistan 1993  Small  market. 
Venezuela No   
Yugoslavia No   
Zambia No   
Zimbabwe No     
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Table III: Summary statistics 
 
 
Variable name  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Skewness  0.0662 0.7918 4.6471  -4.5862 
Lagged detrended turnover -0.0081  0.5298  16.5629  -12.6573 
SSPO feasibility  0.4279 0.4948 1.0000 0.0000 
Monthly  Return  0.0076 0.0950 1.0229  -1.2114 
Liberalization 0.5816 0.4933 1.0000 0.0000 
Volatility 0.0009  0.0050 0.1995 0.0000 
Turnover 0.0826  0.7494 26.0913 0.0000 
Volume  Asymmetry  0.0750 0.2519 1.8500  -2.4031 
Crash  0.0364 0.1873 1.0000 0.0000 







































Table IV: Short-selling and conditional skewness 
 
This table reports estimates from panel regressions of monthly skewness on SSPO feasibility, controlling 
for lagged return, lagged detrended turnover, liberalization, a time trend, and country-fixed-effects (not 
reported). The skewness measure is defined by equation (1) in the text. SSPO feasibility is a binary 
variable that equals one if either short-selling or put option trading is feasible in that country during that 
month. The indicator variable liberalization changes from zero to one in the month after the official 
liberalization date. Lagged return is the index return during the previous month. The variable lagged 
detrended turnover is the one month lag of the average over the previous six months of turnover after it 
is detrended. The detreding is done by subtracting from turnover the average of turnover during the 
previous eighteen months. All regressions are corrected for heteroskedasticity and country-specific 
autocorrelation. The p-value of each estimate is reported in parenthesis. We select countries with changes 
in short-selling or put option trading events. Panel B reports average skewness for these countries before 
and after the event month. The averages are taken for 2-year and 5-year windows. P-value that tests the 
hypothesis of no change is reported in parentheses.  
 
Panel A: Regressions 
     
Independent 
variables 


























































(0.1492)   
-0.0016 








2-year pre-event   0.1109 
  
2-year post-event   0.1298 
  
Change   0.019 
 (0.6267) 
  
5-year pre-event   0.1291 
  
5-year post-event   0.1389 
  
Change   0.01 
 (0.8559) 
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Table V: Short-selling and conditional volatility 
 
This table reports estimates from panel regressions of conditional volatility on SSPO feasibility, 
controlling for liberalization and a country-fixed-effects (not reported). Volatility of daily returns is the 
standard deviation of daily returns computed each month. Volatility of monthly returns is computed using 
the ARCH model given in Equation (3). SSPO feasibility is a binary variable that equals one if either short 
selling or put option trading is possible. The indicator variable liberalization changes from zero to one in 
the month after the official liberalization date. All regression coefficients are corrected for 
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Table VI: Short-selling and market crash 
 
We counted as a crash observation, a month with a negative return larger than 2 standard deviations, 
where the standard deviation of returns is the average of standard deviation of returns during the previous 
three months.  t i crash , = 0, if 
,, 2 it it r σ < and 
t i crash , = 1, otherwise. The average standard deviation 
,, 1 , 2 , 3 ˆˆˆ () / 3 it it it it σ σσσ −−− =+ + . This table reports estimates of panel logit regressions of crash on SSPO 
feasibility, controlling for liberalization, and country-fixed-effects (not reported). SSPO feasibility is a 
binary variable that equals one if either short-selling or put option trading is possible. The indicator 
variable liberalization changes from zero to one in the month after the official liberalization date, which 
was obtained from Bekaert and Harvey (2000). All regressions are corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
country-specific autocorrelation. The p-value of each estimate is reported in parenthesis.  
 
 






      









































Table VII: Short-selling and liquidity 
This table reports estimates from panel regressions of the logarithm of turnover on SSPO feasibility, 
controlling for lagged absolute return, lagged volatility, liberalization, a time trend, and country-fixed-
effects (not reported). Turnover is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of volume of dollar trade 
per month to dollar market capitalization at the end of the month. SSPO feasibility is a binary variable 
that equals one if either short-selling or put option trading is possible. Lagged absolute return is the 
absolute value of index return during the previous month. Lagged volatility is the standard deviation of 
daily returns during the previous month. The indicator variable liberalization changes from zero to one in 
the month after the official liberalization date, which was obtained from Bekaert and Harvey (2000). All 
regressions are corrected for heteroskedasticity and country-specific autocorrelation. The p-value of each 
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0.0374 







           
 



















Table VIII: Short-selling and volume asymmetry 



































where  t i Vol , ,τ  is the daily dollar volume for day τ in month t,  τ D  is a dummy variable that takes on 
value 1 if the return on day τ  is positive and 0 if it is negative; and n is the number of daily observations 
in month t. This table reports estimates from panel regressions of volume asymmetry (VA) on SSPO 
feasibility, a crash variable, and an interaction term crash x SSPO feasibility, controlling for liberalization 
and country-fixed-effects (not reported). Crash is one for a month with a negative return larger than 2 
standard deviations, where the standard deviation of returns is the average of standard deviation of 
returns during the previous three months. SSPO feasibility is a binary variable that equals one if either 
short-selling or put option trading is possible. The indicator variable liberalization changes from zero to 
one in the month after the official liberalization date, which was obtained from Bekaert and Harvey 
(2000). All regressions are corrected for heteroskedasticity and country-specific autocorrelation. The p-
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Table IX: Short-selling and cost of capital: an event study 
 
We collected 31 specific dates when an exchange started allowing short selling or put option trading. 
We use the periods from -130 days to -30 days and from +30 days to +130 days to estimate the 
world market model, which is used to calculate the abnormal returns during the event window. This 
table reports abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) from 5 days before the event 
date to 5 days after the event date. The last row provides the t-statistic associated with the 11-day 
CAR using the methodology proposed by Brown and Warner (1985). 
 
 
  Short-selling & put 
options  
Short-selling only   Put options only  







-5  0.408  0.408  0.181  0.181  0.472  0.472 
-4 0.773  1.181  -0.960  -0.779  1.268  1.74 
-3 0.185  1.366  -0.439  -1.218  0.363  2.103 
-2 0.322  1.688  1.142  -0.076  0.001  2.104 
-1  0.254 1.942  -0.875 -0.951 0.576  2.68 
0  0.295 2.237 2.269  1.318 -0.269 2.411 
1  0.132 2.369 1.583  2.901 -0.282 2.129 
2  0.364 2.733 0.543  3.444  0.314 2.443 
3  0.709 3.442 1.771  5.215  0.405 2.848 
4  0.183 3.625 1.553  6.768 -0.208 2.64 
5  -0.001 3.624 1.259  8.027  -0.465 2.175 



















Table X: Short-selling and cost of capital: using equity return as the cost of capital 
 
Panel A reports the coefficient estimates of the following international asset pricing model:  
( ) t i t i t i t w i t i t f t i e h h r r , , var , , , cov , 0 , , 1 + + + + = − λ φ λ φ α , 
where  cov λ  the estimated price of the covariance risk with the world, and  v var λ  is the estimated price of 
own country variance risk.  t f t i r r , , −  is the monthly equity return for each country minus the one month 
U.S. T-Bill return. The independent variable hi,w, t  is the conditional covariance, and  hi, t, is the conditional 
variance obtained from the multivariate ARCH model in equation (3). The independent variable φi,t 
measures the level of integration of country i at time t, and is defined in equation (6). Panel B reports the 
coefficients from the estimate of the following model with country-fixed-effects (not reported):  
 ei,t = ￿0 +  ￿1 SSPO Feasibilityi,t + ￿2 Foreign Exchange Riski,t + ￿3 Liberalizationi,t + vi,t, 
where  t i e , , is from the above asset pricing model. SSPO feasibility is a binary variable that equals one if 
either short-selling or put option trading is possible. Foreign exchange risk is estimated from the 
multivariate ARCH model in (3). The indicator variable liberalization changes from zero to one in the 
month after the official liberalization date, which was obtained from Bekaert and Harvey (2000). 
 
 
Panel A: Estimates of the international asset pricing model 
Dependent variable   Excess return of country 
Some independent variables    
Covariance of country’s equity return with world equity return multiplied by  
measure of the country’s integration with the world 
cov λ = 5.0457 
(0.0013) 
Variance of the country’s equity return multiplied by one minus measure of 
country’s integration with the world 
var λ = 2.4667 
(0.0727) 
   
 
 
Panel B: Panel regression estimates  
Dependent variable   Residual from risk adjustment model ( t i e , ) 
Independent variables  All countries Developed countries Emerging countries 
      























Table XI: Short-selling and cost of capital: using credit ratings as the cost of capital 
 
The panel regressions with country-fixed effects are based on biannual data from 1979:2 through 2002:2. 
The dependent variable is credit rating, which represents the natural logarithm of a country credit rating.  
Country credit ratings are obtained from Institutional Investor’s semi-annual survey of  75 to 100 bankers.  
Respondents rate each country on a scale of 0 to 100. SSPO feasibility is a binary variable that equals one 
if either short-selling or put option trading is possible. The indicator variable liberalization changes from 
zero to one in the month after the official liberalization date, which was obtained from Bekaert and 







Dependent variable  Credit rating 
Independent variables  All countries  Developed countries Emerging countries
      



















































































Number of countries in the world
Number of countries with  stock
market
Number of countries allowing short
selling
Number of countries where short
selling exists
Number of countries with put options41 
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